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CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.

not lost, the plaintiff had acquired no title to it other than that of bare
possession, and as he had surrendered this in favor of the defendant
there could be no recovery. One is led to ask why the teller individually
was made defendant? It must be taken that the money was delivered to
the teller as the representative of the corporation; and, if this is so, it
would seem that the decision of the Court could be justified on another
ground: that the bank owed to its customer, the true owner, the duty of
keeping for him for an indefinite time property thus left upon its premises.
G. W. P.
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CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
Cases selected by OWEN WISTER.1
•NEGIIG Nc."
i.

Injuries to Person Inflicted while Walking, After Being
Wrongfully Ejected fron Train.
In an action against a railroad company for the death of a passenger
who was killed while walking on the railroad track after having been
wrongfully ejected from defendant's train, the Court properly instructed
the jury that decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence unless
he failed to get off the track at the earliest practicable opportunity that
a reasonably prudent man would have discovered and seized. GREEN,
.J., dissented on the ground that decedent's presence on the track could
only be excused by imperious necessity, which was a question for the
Court; Ham v. Canal Co., 21 Atl. Rep. ioI2, 142 Pa. St., 617, explained:
Ham v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, MITcHELL, J., May 25, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 757, 32 W. N. C., 335.
2.

Injuriesto Person on Railroad Track.

An engineer is not wilfully negligent in failing to stop, while there is
yet time, to examine an object which he supposes to be a dog, or something inanimate, lying on the track, but which, on closer approach, is
discerned to be a child; but is only so negligent in case he might have
stopped after the child had been discerned as such: Louisville, N. 0. &
T. Ry. Co. v. Williams, Supreme Court of Mississippi, WOODS, J., April,
1893, 12 S. Rep., 957.
1During the temporary absence of Mr. WISTER, the cases in this
Department are selected by one of the Editors of the Journal.
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3.

Trespasseron Horse Car- Who is Authorized to Permit One
to Ride.
Where a horse car has both a driver and conductor, and the driver
alone sees a boy stealing a ride on the car, it not being his duty to put
the boy off, the boy being injured cannot claim that he was given an
implied permission to ride: Wynn v. City & Sub. Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Georgia, SrmpKiN, J., March 20, 1893.
Is it correct to assume that because the duties of conductor and
driver are divided by the company, that one manifestly stealing h ride,
would have no right to presume that, the driver seeing him and not telling him to get off, did not authoritatively permit him to ride?
RAILROADS.

4.

Contract of Shipment-Deviation Therefrom-Common Law
Liability of Carrier-Provisionin Contract Limiting
Time Within Which Claim Must be Made.

Where the contractbetween a shipper and a common carrier provides

for carriage by passenger train service, and the carrier transports the
cargo part of the way by freight train, there is a manifest deviation from
the contract, and the liability of the carrier is then fixed by the common"
law. The implied contract in the latter case is that the carrier is an
insurer of the cargo, and is to carry it safely from the point of shipment
to destination unless prevented by "act of God or the public enemy."
This common law rule is founded upon public policy, and the reason for
it is the prevention of fraud, because the cargo is exclusively under the
care of the carrier, who has no interest in it except the comparatively
small one of a freight charge.
Where a contract of shipment provides that no claim for damages
shall be allowed unless made in writing and presented within five days,
from unloading the cargo, such a provision is not affected or abrogated b,'
a deviation from the contract in the matter of the method of transportation. Such a provision is a reasonable one, and will be enforced, becaus6"
the prompt making of the demand gives warning and enables the carrier,
while evidence is attainable and recollection clear, to institute inquiry
into the merits of the claim, and thus guard against fraud or overvaluation.
The distinction between a stipulation going to fix the liability of the
carrier and onfe for his protection against fraud, either before acceptance
of goods or after delivery, is obvious: the law fixes the strict accountability of the carrier while he has possession of the goods,.to prevent him
from defrauding the shipper, and there is no reason why, und'er any
circumstances, it should dedlare abrogated antecedent or subsequent
stipulations on part of the carrier to prevent shippers from defrauding
him: Pavitt v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DEAN, J., February 20, 1893,o32 W. N. C., 65; 153 Pa.;, 302.
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COMMERCIAL LAW.
Casesselected by FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.
NEUGOTIABL

INSTRUM ENTS.

Promissory Note-Payment to Take Out of Statute of Limitations.
Where, after the maturity of a note, there are independent business
1.

transactions between the maker and payee, which are unsettled at the

time action is brought on the note, the fact that there was a balance due
the maker on such transactions, which ought to have been indorsed on
the note, does not constitute a partial payment thereon, so as to prevent.
the running of the statute of limitations against the note prioi to the ttme
that such transactions ceased, in the absence of any agreement by the
maker that it should be so indorsed: Sears v. Hicklin, Court of Appeals
of Colorado, REED, J., May 22, x893, 33 Pac. Rep., 137.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
2. Promiseto Answerfor the Debt of Another.
Defendant's contract for the erection of an opera house provided
that, if the contractors failed to furnish material, defendant could supply

the material, and deduct the cost from the prite. Plaintiffs, after furnishing certain material on the contractors' credit, refused to furnish more,
and an arrangement was made whereby, on the contractors' written order
to defendant, the architect was to make the estimates and payments
directly to plaintiffs. Held, that the agreement was not within .the Statute of Frauds, as it wasnot a promise to pay plaintiffs' debt, but to benefit defendant, by the immediate acquisition of materials for the building;
Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich., 324, followed: Brice v. Marquette Opera.
House Bdg. Co., Supreme Court of Michigan, LONG, J., June I, 1893, 55

N. W. Rep., 382.
ASSIGNMENT.

3.

Forthe Be.efit of Creditors-Action to Set Aside-Limit of
Decree.

Where one creditor alone sues to set aside an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, and subject the property to the satisfaction of his
judgment, it is error, on setting the assignment aside, to decree distribution firo ratabetween plaintiff-and other creditors, the latter of whom
are not parties to the suit, since, as they would not be bound by a judgment against them, they cannot have the benefit of a judgment in their
favor: Ryttenberg v. Keels, Supreme Court of South Carolina, MCINER,
C. J., A'pril 21, 1893 , 17 S. R. Rep.. 441.
PLEDGE.

4. Left Secured.
On borrowing money from a bank, the borrower deposited stock as
collateral security, and gave a demand note providing that if he should
come under any liability, or enter into any other engagement with said
bank, the net proceeds of the sale of the pledged stock should be applied,
either on this note or any of his other liabilities. Held, that only future

CRIMINAL LAW.
liabilities were contemplated by the parties, and that the stock could not
be held as security for a responsibility wvhich had accrued nearly five
months before making the pledge: Franklin Bank v. Harris, Court of
Appeals of Maryland, BRISCOE, J., April 21, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 523.
TirLx.

S. Transferance of-Indorsementfor Collection.
An indorsement of a draft to a bank- "for collection," accompanied
by a credit of the amount of the draft upon the indorser's account with
the bank, does not transfer to the bank the legal title to such draft, and
a correspondent of the bank, who collects the draft for it, is responsible
therefor to the indorser: Tyson v. West. Nat. Bk. of Balto., Cqurt'of
Appeals of Maryland, BRYAN, J., March I6, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 520.

CRIMINAL LAW.
3. BRYON.

Cases -selectedby ROBERT
CARRYING WEAPONS.

I.

Self-Defence.

The fact that i weapon is drawn in self-defence does not exempt tle one drawing it from indictment for unlawfully carrying arms: Miller v.
State,'Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, SIMKINS, J., April 29, 1893,
22 S. W. Rep., 141. "
EVIDENCE.

Expert Testimony in .urder Trial.
2.
On a murder trial it is error to permit experts to give opinions as to
the range of the bullet which passed through deceased's head, or the
position of his hand and arm, when he was shot in the arm and body,
where they.are formed from proven facts,.since it is for the jury to draw
their own conclusions: Poster iv. State, Supreme Court of Mississippi,
WOODS, J., April I7, 1893, 12 So. Rep., 822.
SALB OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

3. Defence.
It is no defence to a prosecutiQn for selling intoxicating liquors that
defendant did not know that they were intoxicating: State v. Lindoen,
Supreme Court of Iowa, ROBINSON, C. J., May 10, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep.,
1075.
THEFT.
4.

Wlat Constitutes.
Where defendant, who wished to leave the neighborhood to avoid a
difficulty, took his cousin's saddle on the pretense of borrowing it to go
hunting, but left with .him more than sufficient property to pay for it,.
with a letter directing him to take such property in payment, such taking
did not constitute theft: Beckham v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas, SIMKINS, J., lay IO, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 411.

EQUITY-EVIDENCE.

EQUITY.
Cases selected by

ROBERT P. BRADFORD.

BXP~iESS TRUSTS.
IPartPerformance.
Where it is attempted to engraft an express trust on a conveyance
absolute in its terms, the "doctrine of part performance" has no application: Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Kistler, Supreme Court
of Minnesota, MITCHEIL, J., April 27, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., io63.
RvSCISSION OF CONTRACT.

2.

Concealment-Parlners.

The managing partner of a mining venture made a complete contract by correspondence to purchase the interest of his absent partner,
the consideration being the release of the latter from liability upon a
note given to the former. Before the deed was executed by the absent
partner a rich vein of ore was discovered on the claim, of which discovery the absent partner was not informed. Held, That the absent
partner could not maintain a bill to set aside the deed; 36 Fed. Rep., 138,
reversed; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall., 7o ,distinguished: Patrikv. Bowman, Supreme Court of the United States, BROWN, J., FULLER, C. J.,
and BREWER, J., dissenting, April 24, 1893, 13 S. C. Rep., 8i.

EVIDENCE.
Cases selected by WILLIAM

DRAPER LEWIS.

PjzmLEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

i. Attorney and Client.
Communications between an attorney and his client concerning
proposed infractions of law are not privileged: Hickman v. Treen,
Supreme Court of Missouri, SHERWOOD, J., GANTT, P. J., dissenting,
May 2, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 455. See in this connection I Wharton's
Crim. Evd.(3d ed.), 590 and cases cited; .also 7 Amer. and Eng. Ency.
of Law, io3.
*WITNESSES.
2.

Credibility of-Old Slaves.

Testimony of a witness, who was formerly a slave, that he is 117
years old, does not affect his credibility as to events to which he testifies,
nor does the discrepancy as to dates in the statements of other witnesses,
who. also were slaves, affect tdeir credibility: Davis v. Meaux, Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, BENNETT, C. J., May 6, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 324.
The Court's opinion as to the ieality of this great age is seen from the
following abstract from the opinion: " .
.. It is to be remembered
that they are old slaves, who knew but little about dates, time, or
numbers.

3.

Exfiert Witnesses in Murder Trial. See

CRIMINAL LAW.
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HORACe" L. CIHF-tNEY.

Casesselected by
CANCELLATION.

i. Notice of.

In an actioti on a fire insurance policy an affidavit of defence setting
up cancellation of the policy, and notice thereof to the representatives
of the insured, was adjudged insufficient on the ground that notice of cancellation served on the brokers who procured the insurance was invalid.
Held-error, the policy hhving provided for notice of cancellation to the
insured or his representatives, and the affidavit of defence having alleged
the giving of notice to the brokers in question, and that they were the
agents and representatives of the plaintiffs in all matters respecting the
insurance; 53 Fed. Rep., 340, reversed: Grace v. Insurance Co., 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 207, 109 U. S., 278, distinguished: Royal Ins. Co. v. Wight,
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, ACHESON, Cir. J., April
25, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 455.
PREmium NoTE.
2. Action on-Parol Agreement for Rebate.
A parol agreement made by a mutual life insurance company with a
policy holder at the time that the latter executes his premium note,
payable four months after date, that the maker should hive a rebate of
3o per cent. of the face of the note, is not contradictory of the written
obligation, and in action by such company against the maker, an affidavit
of defence setting up such parolagreement is sufficient: Michigan Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, DEAN, J.,
MITCHELL, J., dissenting, May 22, 1893,26 Atf. Rep., 655; 32W. N. C., 353
WAGERING CONTRACT OF II1E INSURANCE.

3.

InsurableInterest-Husbandand Wife.

A man may insure his own life, paying the premiums himself for the
benefit of another, who has no insurable interest, and such a transaction
is not a wagering policy: Scott v. Dickson, xo8 Pa., 6, followed: Overbeck v. Overbeck; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PER CURIAm, January 3, 1893, 155 Pa., S; Hill v. United Life Ins. Assn., 154 Id., 29; 31 W.
N. C., 483.
A policy was taken out by William.H. Overbeck upon his own life
"payab!e at his death to his wife, Mary Overbeck, orto the heirs at law
of said William H. Overbeck." The Mary Overbeck mentioned in the
policy was not the legal wife of the assured, by reason of his prior marriage with another. Held, that Mary Overbeck was entitled to the
amount of the policy: Overbeck v. Overbeck, supra.
Not decided, whether a woman who marries a man, in ignorance of
the fact that he had previously contracted a legal marriage with another
woman who is still in full life, and from whom he had never been
divorced, has an insurable interest in his life: Ibid.
4. Tontine Assignmient-Payment to FiducialAgency.
Where ten persons take out policies of insurance on their respective
lives and then execute to an agency a tontine assignment, providing for
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the distribution of the proceeds of the assignor's policy among the survivors of the ten, and the appointee or legal representatives of the
assignor, the agency so appointed is the only party entitled to collect
the insurance money from the company. Such a payment to the ageuc7
discharges the insurance company from all liability to pay to the legal
representatives or appointees of the insured. Not decided, whether the
legal representatives of the insured could recover from the agency that
collected the money from the company: Hill v. United Life Ins. Ass'n,
Supreme. Court of Pennsylvania, PAXSON, C. J., January 3, 1893; 31 W.
N. C., 483; 154 Pa., 29.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by ARDicuUS SThwART.

PLEADING.
MALICIOUS PR6SEcUTION.
. Declaration-Sufficiency.
A declaration for malicious prosecution, stating that.the grand jury
had made a return of "no bill" upon a bill of indictment, and
"expressed" in their finding that the prosecution was malicious, sufficiently alleged that the prosecution had ended; Woodruff v. Woodruff,
22 Ga., 237, followed: Horn v. Sims, Supreme Court of Georgia, PER
CURIAm, April 17, 1893,. 17 S. W. Rep., 670.
2. Plea ofJustification-Rightto Open and Close.
In a suit for malicious prosecution, a plea to the effect that the
defendant, without any malice whatever, consented to become prosecutor
as a matter of friendship to another, and upon the assurance of the solicitor general that so doing was "only a matter of form," is not a plea of
justification, and does not entitle the defendant to the opening and conclusion: Horn v. Sims, sufira.
STATEMENT.

3. Rule for Afore Specific Statement-Demurrer.
A rule absolute for a more specific statement, on the ground that the
statement does not set forth a good cause-of action, is erroneous, as the
proper and only way to raise that question is by demurrer: Bradly v.'
Potts, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, MITCHULL, J., May 22, 1893, 26
Atl. Rep., 734; 155 Pa.,418.
PRACTICE.
NEw TRIAL.
4. Misconduct offjudg-Private Cdnmunicationwith Jury.
'Where thetrial judge, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, enters the jury room while the jury are deliberating on their verdict,
and communicates with them in reference to ordering supper if they
were not likely to agree before meal time, the verdict will be set aside,
and a new trial granted, though the communication is harmless in itself,
and made with the best of motives: Davies v. Pearson, Appellate Court
of Indiana, LoTz, J., April 11, 13893, 33 N. E. Rep., 976.

PROPERTY,
FEDERAL PRACTICE.
5. Distincion between Law and Equity in Federal Courts. See
EgUITY, I.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by WILLIAm A. DAvIS.
CONTRACT IOR SALE ON LAND.
1. Merger in Deed- Voluntary Payment-TaxesPaidby Vendor.
A contract for sale of land obligated the vendor to execute a deed on
payment of the price on a specified date, the vendees to pay all taxes in
the meantime. Held, that such contract became merged in the deed
subsequently executed by the vendor, dnd that since the taxes assessed
during the existence of the contract became a lien on the land, and created no personal liability as against the vendor, he was not entitled to
recover from the vendees for such taxes paid by him after the execution
of the deed; also, held, that the payment by him of the taxes was purely
voluntary, and for this additional reason he is not entitled to recover:
Keator v. Colorado Coal and Iron Development Co., Court of Appeals of
Colorado, BISSELL; J., March 27, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 857.
COVENANT INhLEASE.
2. Quiet Enjoyment--.easureof DamagesforBreach.
.Where a lessor recovers judgment for rent against a lessee by default,
the lessee is not barred from seeking damages for a breach of an implied
covenant for quiet enjoyment by his failure to plead it in defense of the
action for rent.
Where a lessee is excluded from possession, but is compelled to pay
rent during the period of exclusion, the measure of damages for a breach
of the covenant for quiet enjoyment is the difference between the agreed
rental and the actual rental value, increased by the amount paid by the
lessee: Riley v. Hale, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ALLEN,
J., March, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 491.

ELEVATED RAILROADS.
3. Injury to Abutting Property Owners.
Though 'n elevated railroad constructs a station projecting into a
side street, infringing on the public righttherein, the abutting owner, in
his capacity as a citizen merely, cannot maintain an equitable action for
its removal, nor can he maintain it as the abutting owner, where it does
not appear that he owns the soil occupied by the station, or that he has
sustained any substantial injury by the encroachment, to any right appurtenant to his premises: Adler v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., Court of
Appeals of New York, ANDREWS, C. J., April 25, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 935
(reversing S. C., i8 N. Y. Supp., 858). See Collins v. Northeastern Elevated Railway Co., 32 W. N. C. (Pa.), 379; Decker v. Evansville Suburban
Railway Co., 33 N. E. Rep. (Ind.), 349, 32 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND R viEw, 6o8.

PROPERTY.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

4.

Parties-Rightsof Lessee-Res Jiudicata-Suis at Law and
in Equity.
A judgment condemning land for public use does not affect a lessee's
right of possession when he is not made a party.
Where a lessee who was not made a party to condemnation proceedings brings suit to enjoin a city from opening a street through the leased
premises, a decree finding that the equities are with the defendant, and
dismissing the bill, does not bar the lessee from maintaining a subsequent
action at law to assert his legal right of possession: Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co. v. Parrette, Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, E. D.,
SAGE, D. J., March io, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 5o.
GIFT.
5.
alidity-Revocation-Deliveryand Record of Deed.
The grantor executed and acknowledged a deed of land to his son,
and filed it for record, and the son took possession and remained thereon
for seven weeks, when he died. Thereafter the clerk died without putting the deed on record, and the grantor obtained possession of the deed
and destroyed it. Held,,a valid gift, and that the destruction of the
deed could not revoke it: Vaughan v. Moore, Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia, FAUNTIZROY, J., March 30, 1893, 17 S E. Rep., 326.
POST-NUPTIAL SETTLEMENT.

6. Dower-Judgment Lien.
At the time of the mnarriage the husband's lands were all free from
judgment liens, but after judgments were obtained against him, in conI sideration of a settlement on her of a portion of his lands, the wife
relinquished her right of dower in all his other lands, which right of
dower was of greater value than the lands settled on her. Held, that
the post-nuptial settlement was valid as against such judgment creditors:
Ficklin's Adm'r. v. Rixey, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, LEwis,
P., April 6, 1893, 17 S. E. Rep., 325.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
7. Obstructionof NavigableStream-Right o Damages-Rights
of Publicin PrivateCanal.
The owner of land near, but not adjoining, a navigable stream cannot maintain an action for damages for the obstruction of the stream by
a viaduct, unless he has sustained some special damage thereby, distinct
from the public at large.
Where such owner alleges that his lands are suitable foi purposes of
manufacturing, docking, etc., but it is problematical whether there will
*ever be a demand for them for such purposes, his damages for such
obstruction are purely speculative.
A canal constructed and maintained at private expense is like a
private highway, over which the public is permitted to travel, but in
which it obtains no vested rights" Potter v. Indiana & L. M. Ry. Co.,
Supreme Court of Michigan, GRANTJ., April 21,1893, 54N. W. Rep., 956.

TORTS.

TORTS.
Casesselected by

ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUER.

AcTIoN AGAINST UNITED STATES SOUNDING IN TORT.
1. Non-liability of Government.
The United States, while it may be sued as upon an implied contract
for the value of land actually appropriated to public use, when the right
of the plaintiff is acknowledged, is yet not subject to such suit when
plaintiff's right of property has never been acknowledged; nor can a
claim be legally framed to evade the settled distinction between a
trespass by government officers and an implied contract to compensate
for use and occupation; the action is founded upon a tart, and .the
government is not suable: Hill v. United States, Supreme Court of the
United States, GRAY, J. (SHIRAS, J., dissenting), May I5, 1893, 13 Sup.
Ct. Rep.,. ioII.
CONVBRSION.

2.

What Constitutes-Collection of Tolls b3 Officers of Road
Compbany.

The facts found by the Court in its special findings showed that-

defendants were respectively- president and treasurer of plaintiff gravel'"
road company, afid that as such they took possession of and managed.
the gravel road and collected tolls belonging to plaintiff, but -it was not
found that they wrongfully took possession of the road and collected,
tolls, nor that they converted such tolls to their own use, nor that on
demand they refused to account therefor. Held, that since plaintiff
based its right of recovery on a conversion, the facts found did not
warrant a judgment in its favor: Sloan v. Lick Creek and N. B. Grand
Road Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, Ross, J;, April 28, 1893, 33 N. E.
Rep., 997.
DECEIT.

3. Measure of Damages.
In an action of assumpsit for the price of certain ores, the evidence
showed that the defendants were induced to enter into the contract by
plaintiff's false statements, but accepted the ores after discovering the
falsity of the statements. Held, that the true measure of damages for the
deceit was the difference between the contract price of the ores and their
value in the market at the time, unaffected by the false representation,
and not such sum as the jury might find from all the evidence was the
value of the ores to defendants; Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. Div., 54r, and
Smith v. Bolles, io S. C. Rep., 39; 132 U. S., 125, distinguished: McHose
v. Earnshaw, -Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, DALLAS, C. J.,
April 17, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 584.

4, QuestionforJury.
Plaintiff was in the employ of a city, working in a ditch at a point
where it crossed the street under defendant's track; defendant's employes, in charge of a car which struck plaintiff, omitted to give any
warning of the approach of such car; previously they had given such
warning each time that the car approached such point. Held, that the
question of defendant's negligence was a question of fact for thd jury,
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though such employes moved the car very slowly, and excused the
omission of the warning on the ground that they looked ahead and saw
the way was clear: Owens v. Peoples' Pass. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, May 22, 1893, 26 AtI. Rep., 748, 32 W. N. C., 313, 155 Pa.,
_ 334-

WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Casesselected by MAURICE C.

BELKNAP.

COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX.

i.

Choses in Action-on-residents-Conveyance to take Effect
after Grantor'sDeath.
Choses in action, such as bonds, stocks, debts, etc., have their situs,
for the purpose of taxation, at the domicile of their owner, and that the
legal title is in a non-resident trustee will not free such property from
subjection to collateral inheritance tax where the grantor has retained
a beneficial interest therein and control of the disposition of the property
upon his death.
A resident of Pennsylvania transferred securities to a corporation in
New York, in trust, to pay the income during his life, and on his death
to distribute the property to certain beneficiaries, reserving the power to
alter or revoke the trust; he died domiciled in Pennsylvania without
having exercised the power. Held, that while the New York corporation
had the legal title to such securities, the deceased was the beneficial
owner, and in every proper sense of the term they were his personal
property, and his residence was their situs for the purposes of.taxation,
including collateral inheritance tax: Lines' Estate, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, STERRETT, C. J., May 22, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 728, 32 V. N.
C., 376, 155 Pa., 378..
PROBATE.
2.
Aifandamus-Setting Aside Probateof Will.
A mandamus will not be granted to compel a probate judge to vacate
an order admitting a will to probate: "Corby v. Wayne, Probate Judge,
Supreme Court of Michigan, HOOKER, C. 1., June 1, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep.,
386.

RIGHT or WIDOW IN DECEDENT'S ESTATE.

3. Waiver-Failureto Show Foreign Law.
Where testator in his will devised all his estate to his nephews and
nieces, declaring that his wife had already received the major portion of
his estate, an agreement made during his lifetime, while he and his wife
were residing with his cousin, by which in consideration of his securing
to her a certain sum, she waived such claims as she might have as widow
by or under the laws of Wisconsin, was held insufficient to defeat her
claim to an allowance and a distributive share of his personal estate
under the laws of Michigan, because the law of Wisconsin giving her like
rights was not shown in the petition enjoining her claim, and therefore
the Court presumed the common law rule prevailed there, which gave her
neither: Knapp v. Knapp, Supreme Court of Michigan, HOOKER, C. J.,
May 31, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 353.

